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THE BATTLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROVISIONS IN MONTANA'S 1972
CONSTITUTION
C. Louise Cross*
If birds and beasts abound no more,
And fish grow scarce on every shore,
What chance have you and I, my friend,
To meet a better, gladder end?
Anonymous
All beings-birds, beasts, fish, and humans-are connected.'
And the health of the earth and of human beings ultimately de-
pends on protecting the earth and its creatures. Awareness of this
connection between all organisms prompted the drafting of Mon-
tana's environmental-protection provisions, which place a preemi-
nent priority on the environment.
The Montana Constitution's recognition of the preeminence of
the environment is unique. It begins with a preamble protective of
the environment, and then states in its declaration of rights that
"the right to a clean and healthful environment" 2 has priority over
* Chairperson, Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture, 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Currently, Ms. Cross is curator of the Frontier Gateway Museum in Glendive.
She also is a local historian, specializing in Glendive and Dawson County. This article is
based on a speech the author gave as part of the Environmental Panel at the Constitutional
Symposium '89, November 16, 1989, additional research by the Montana Law Review edi-
tors, and notes the author made at the end of the 1972 convention. See Thoughts from a
Committee Chairman, record series 22, folio 4-1, Montana State Archives, Helena,
Montana.
1. Part of the belief of the environmental movement that all organisms are connected
evolved from noted conservationist John Muir's view that all organisms-"animals, the
rocks, the flowers, [and] the micro-organisms" are "bound fast by a thousand invisible
cords." Everything Is Bound Fast By a Thousand Invisible Cords: The Future of the Con-
servation Community in the American West: Keynote Address at the Montana Wilderness
Association by Charles Wilkinson, WILD MONTANA, Mar. 1988, at 4 [hereinafter Wilkinson].
Muir felt so strongly the interconnectedness of all beings that he "had trouble with the idea
of human beings living off the earth." Id. Interestingly, "Muir never lived off the land dur-
ing his extended journeys into the wilderness. He did not hunt or fish or gather-he either
carried bread or went hungry. He was profoundly spiritual and saw divine life in all of
nature." Id.
Muir helped build respect for the environment through "his own genius, eyes, and feet,
sojourning throughout the wild lands of the West, gathering data with the benefit of little
formal education." Id. "[A]n amazing physical specimen," he "routinely hiked 20-40 miles
per day." Id. "From the ground up, he effectively created a new way of looking at the sci-
ence of nature." Id. Muir's highly evolved views-seeing the spiritual connection between all
beings-were so ahead of his time that they "make many people of the 1980's uncomforta-
ble." Id.
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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even freedoms of religion, 3 assembly,4 and speech.5 Then, demon-
strating its full commitment to environmental protection, Mon-
tana's constitution devotes a full article-article IX-to the envi-
ronment. However, I am here to tell you that these constitutional
environmental protections did not come easily. Not only were
"most of the proposals ... debated at length by the Committee on
Natural Resources and Agriculture, and developed into committee
proposals for consideration by all convention delegates,"" but as
one newspaper reporter said, "The environmental proposal[s]
w[ere] drafted after weeks of haggling over wording."'
As chairperson of the Committee on Natural Resources and
Agriculture, I would like to share a view from the trenches as to
how the environmental provisions of Montana's constitution were
drafted. From the vantage of nineteen years and my memory of
what happened in the committee, I seriously question whether if
any other person had been chairperson, a separate article on the
environment and natural resources would now exist. My commit-
ment to the preservation of land, water, and air gave me the neces-
sary tenacity to bring these provisions to fruition.
I. THE ENVIRONMENT AS A PUBLIC TRUST
Part of the battle over the environmental provisions included
whether to include a public-trust provision. Public trust was then
and still is an emerging idea that basically states that Montana's
"total environment would be considered a 'trust' under the stew-
ardship of the state ... to be managed for the benefit of the pub-
lic."8 Classic public-trust doctrine had been applied to "shorelands
and waterways, but controls over air and water pollution derive in
part from the idea that air and water belong to the people and
can't be ruined."9 The public-trust provision proposed at the Con-
vention was to "go beyond air and water" and to provide "stan-
dards for the use of the environment, including land," that would
have ensured these resources "continued quality."'"
Each committee chairperson had been asked to submit a guest
editorial prior to the convening of the Convention. This is part of
3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 6.
4. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 6.
5. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7.
6. Schmidt and Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a Clean and
Healthful Environment, supra this volume.
7. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 29, 1972, at 9, col. 1.
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what I wrote on January 13, 1972, regarding environmental
protection:
Since [we humans] first laid eyes upon the treasure of this
earth, there has been some conflict between what [we] wanted to
take from it, and what [we] should leave for generations yet to
come. However it has not been until the last decade or so that [we
have] obviously consumed beyond the capacity of nature to
restore.
This march of what [we] would take against what [we] must
leave, if [our] progeny is to survive, cannot be solved by the Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention, nor can it provide the courage to
some future legislator, nor [can it] protect [us] from [our] own
avarice. However, within its framework, the constitution can pro-
vide the means and rights within which Montanans can protect
themselves if they will.
There is no section in the present Montana Constitution
which deals with natural resources and agriculture. Perhaps there
should be. A great grass roots realization has grown among the
people of the state that the time has come for a long range view
of the use of natural resources.11
The Committee on Natural Resources and Environment began
its meetings in a friendly atmosphere in anticipation of the work of
the convention. During the first few days we tried to assess each
other's personalities and interests. However, before we concluded
our work, and by the end of the final public hearing on February
10, 1972, the committee was completely polarized on the environ-
mental article.
12
While my remarks are not meant to be derogatory, or to di-
minish the good intentions or sincerity of any individual commit-
tee member, it seems to me that the makeup of the committee was
unfortunate to begin with. I, evidently, was chosen as chairperson
and member of the committee because of my known stand on the
environment and natural resources. I presume that Henry Siderius,
a farmer from Kalispell, was chosen for the same reason. The other
seven were unknown quantities: John Anderson was a rancher
from Dillon; Geoffrey Brazier was a lawyer from Helena; Douglas
Delaney was a rancher from Grass Range; E.S. "Erv" Gysler, the
vice-chairperson, was a manufacturer from Fort Benton; Arthur
Kamhoot was a semi-retired businessman from Forsyth; Charles
McNeil was a lawyer and metallurgical engineer from Polson; and
11. Helena Independent Record, Jan. 13, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
12. Seven committee members opposed the article and two supported it.
1990]
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Donald Rebal was an automobile dealer from Great Falls.
The imbalance of the committee members relative to their
feelings on what should be done in the area of the environment
became apparent fairly early in the committee work, and by the
time we reached the deadline for delegate proposals an impasse
was a foregone conclusion.
It was in a joint hearing of the Natural Resources and Bill of
Rights Committee on February 1, 1972, that I "lambast[ed] the
status quo" and made what one reporter called a "fiery" plea for a
strong environmental article.'3 I pointed out that
[tihere comes a time when the status quo is not good
enough-either in the lives of individuals or in the affairs of [hu-
manity]. It has become increasingly clear that the status quo is
woefully lacking as far as the environment and the use of natural
resources is concerned. If this were not so, the outcry would not
be so great. We have reached a point where nature no longer has
the ability to restore what [humanity] consumes. Not too many
years ago, it was thought that water, given enough miles, could
clean itself. Now we have dead lakes and streams devoid of
aquatic life. As one wag put it-too thick to drink and too thin to
plow. 4
I also criticized air pollution, clear-cutting, and the strip mining of
coal.'5
At the time of this joint hearing, I did not have a specific pro-
posal. However, at the final public hearing on February 10, 1972, I
presented Proposal 162-the environment as a public
trust-coupled with the citizen's right to sue. The proposal read:
The state of Montana shall maintain and enhance a high quality
environment as the public trust. Such obligation shall apply to all
aspects of environmental quality including, but not limited to, air,
water, land, wildlife, minerals, forests, and open space. The sole
beneficiary of the trust shall be the citizens of Montana, who shall
have the duty to maintain and enhance the trust, and the right to
enforce it by appropriate legal proceedings against the trustee."
The concept of "public trust" certainly was not new-it went
back to the 19th century. Theodore Roosevelt thought it was a
13. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 2, 1972, at 8, col. 4.
14. Statement of Chairman Cross, Joint Hearing of Committee on Bill of Rights and
Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture, record series 22, folio 4-2, Montana State
Archives, Helena, Montana.
15. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 2, 1972, at 8, col. 4.
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good idea.1" And several states had incorporated public-trust or
similar concepts into their statutes. 18 My personal mail-ranging
from students to life-long Republicans-was running eight to one
in favor of a public-trust proposal. Republicans wrote that two
years earlier the idea of a public-trust proposal would have been
unthinkable to them, but by the time of the convention they were
acknowledging that such a proposal was proving to be a necessity.
Many witnesses appeared at the public-trust hearing to sup-
port the proposal. Among them were United States Senator Lee
Metcalf, several legislators, and then-State Representative and
chairman of Environmental Quality Council George Darrow. Ac-
cording to a report in the Helena Independent Record at the time,
Darrow's "proposal would [have] give[n] the state and individual
citizens the right to 'maintain the integrity of the environmental
life support system' but also would [have] provide[d] for compen-
sation for taking of private property."'' Calling the public trust
"an important and necessary preventive measure to take for the
future," Darrow stated: "If, after the pollution occurs, we're going
to play cops and robbers trying to clean it up, we never will begin
to catch up with our problems."20
Both the public-trust and the citizen-suit concepts were later
presented to the committee as a whole and debated vigorously.
Delegate Cate moved to reinsert the public-trust language into sec-
tion (1) of article IX.21 Speaking in support of that amendment, he
said:
Our system of consumption in this country has got to change.
We've- got the Beartooth Mountains over there, they're the high-
est mountains in Montana, and I think they're the most beautiful
mountains in Montana, and I've been in those Beartooth Moun-
tains many times. We've got five mining companies that want to
go in there, and they want to take those mountains, they want to
rip them wide open. They want to dig a pit 5 miles long and 3
miles wide. And once they've dug that pit and taken that soil and
17. President Roosevelt ("working in concert with Gifford Pinchot, his chief forester")
withdrew 150 million acres of land for national forest reserves in 1901 "with a few strokes"
of his pen. FEDERAL PuBLIc LAND REsoURcEs LAW (G. Coggins & C. Wilkinson ed. 1986).
18. Delaware, for example, has a statute that states "[riare and endangered species are
a public trust in need of active, protective management, and that it is the broad public
interest to preserve and enhance such species." DEL. CODE ANN. § 7-2-201(2) (1989). Penn-
sylvania uses the doctrine in its more traditional applications, protecting the public's right
to use navigable lakes or streams for "recreation, fishing or other public trust purposes." PA.
STAT. ANN. § 32-25-693.15 (1988).
19. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 2, 1972, at 8, col. 4.
20. Id.
21. IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 1214.
1990]
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that land out of there and polluted the rivers down below it, it's
not going to be there any more, and you can't put it back ...
Well, let's make it more expensive to go into those mountains and
tear them down forever .... [Y]ou fly over these mountains from
the west and you see this rim of pollution laying below the moun-
tains, just waiting to come over into our state and pollute our air
forever .... We've got one of the last vestiges in our country, one
of the last places that can be saved; and we shouldn't be satisfied
with the standard that Illinois has or the standard that Michigan
has, because they're already ruined .... They're never going to
come back. But we can save Montana. We can make Montana a
paradise in this country, and that's what we ought to do.2"
Delegate Cate's remarks met with so much applause that Chair-
man Graybill had to caution the galleries against future demon-
strations.23 However, the Natural Resources Committee still turned
the public-trust proposal down.2'
Unfortunately, Delegate Charles McNeil gave our committee's
report to the committee as a whole on proposed article IX. Op-
posed to the public-trust proposal, which already had been consid-
ered and rejected, McNeil gave his rationale for that rejection on
the floor of the convention.25 Not surprisingly, as far as I was con-
cerned, he and I were antagonists on the environmental issues un-
til the adjournment of the convention.
In addition to Delegate McNeil's opposition to the public-
trust proposal, some of the other delegates opposed the proposal
with arguments that were just plain silly. For example, some of
them tried to contend that the citizen-suit proposal meant that an-
yone could "sue for [a violation of the doctrine over] the slightest
trace of dust; '2 6 and that a transient who thought somebody's cow
was a detriment to the environment could sue.27 For example, op-
ponents of the measure "expressed fears that environmental [har-
assment] lawsuits could be started by hitchhikers passing though
the state or national organizations with no direct stake in the Mon-
tana environment" despite repeated assurances to the contrary.28
Opponents also raised fears of confiscation of property, which, sim-
ilarly, would not have happened.2 9 However, when a member of my
22. Id. at 1227 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 565 (Montana Constitutional Convention, Natu-
ral Resources and Agriculture Committee Report)(Appendix B).
25. IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 1200-01.
26. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 2, 1972, at 8, col 4.
27. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 16, 1972, at 18, col. 2.
28. Id.
29. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 29, 1972, at 8, col. 2.
[Vol. 51
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committee labeled Delegate Proposal 162 on the Public Trust as
"socialism," 30 the resistance to it completely solidified, and the
committee voted seven to two against it. After that, I had the dubi-
ous distinction of not even having the courtesy of a minority report
from my own committee, and I told the committee of the whole as
much during the debate on the majority report."1
The committee had debated at length the language to be con-
tained in the environmental provisions. For instance, take the
word "healthful" in the phrase, "clean and healthful environ-
ment. '3 2 No one challenged the word "clean," but "healthful"
caused some hangups because no one could agree as to how to de-
fine it. I told a newspaper reporter at the time that "I [had] heard
arguments that individuals really don't have the right to a health-
ful environment-because it [was] too hard to define the term
'healthful.' ,,33 My response was, "Do people have to become ill or
drop in their tracks before the word 'healthful' can be defined?
'34
I wondered if "health" and "healthful" had ever been defined
legally. The quickest place to go was the attorney general's office.
My reputation must have preceded me. An assistant met me at the
door and told me that the attorney general was not available. The
attorney general's office doubted that the words had any precedent
in relation to the environment. Later, I asked our research assis-
tant to see what could be found in the law library. The term had
been legally defined on several occasions.
II. RECLAMATION
Section 2 of article IX deals with the reclamation of land.
3 5
This very issue led to my running for a seat in the convention. I
had been reading the book, Night Comes to the Cumberlands by
Henry Caudill.36 It told the tragic story of the devastation caused
by strip mining in Kentucky and the Appalachian region. A United
States report on Surface Mining told the same grim story: devas-
tated farm land, polluted water, abject poverty, and people unable
to control their own destinies for several generations.37 Large-scale
30. Delegate Brazier later repeated this characterization of the public trust concept in
a remark to the committee of the whole. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 1223.
31. IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 1199.
32. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. Helena Independent Record, Feb. 2, 1972, at 8, col. 4.
34. Id.
35. Section 2 provides that "[aIll lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources
shall be reclaimed." MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
36. H. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1963).
37. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, STUDY OF STRIP AND SURFACE MINING IN APPALACHIA
1990] 455
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strip mining loomed on the horizon in eastern Montana. There
were no protective laws, nor any regulations. Reclamation was
practically unknown. I wrote more than 400 letters to legislators,
people in state offices, and citizens' groups to alert them to the
problem. When the Constitutional Convention was called, I de-
cided it was the vehicle in which something could be done.
I went to the Montana Department of State Lands to find out
if the mining companies were doing any reclamation. The word
"stone-walling" was not in common usage in 1972 but should have
been, because I was "stone-walled" all the way. Why reclamation
generated such opposition is still hard for me to understand. Not
only did opposition come from the expected quarters, but also
from a good number of farmers and ranchers-the very people for
whom I felt needed and could be helped by a reclamation provi-
sion. There were only a few times that my feelings got the better of
me. But one afternoon, after listening to a parade of ranchers de-
cry the proposed reclamation provision, I positively hated the sight
of cowboy boots.
I addressed the convention on the reclamation proposal when
it was presented for floor debate. One of the committee members
had agreed to rise and speak to the issue, but some sixth sense
warned me to be prepared and not take that chance. The day had
been very long and tiring, but I stayed up until 2 a.m. working on a
statement. When our committee was to rise and report, nothing
happened. So I rose, read the statement, and then spoke to the
issue. I said,
we have coal trains going out of this state at the rate of three a
day. There are at least 100 cars in each train, and each of these
trains contain[s] 10,000 tons of coal .... At night, I can tell when
a coal train goes by because of the sound of the rails. The weight
is so heavy there is a zing to them. And you can tell these trains
are going through just by listening. Anybody who lives three
blocks away from that train can also feel the reverberations which
have been, at times, equivalent to the earthquake tremors that
have happened in Helena, and the shades on the windows shake..
• . Now, I don't know how many of you have actually seen the
spoilbanks in the strip-mining areas. As feats of engineering, they
are awesome indeed. And if you're lucky enough to get past the
areas where the tours are conducted and where some experiments
in the revegetation of the area go[], you'll come back with a feel-
ing of utter desolation. Those spoilbanks are as lifeless as the
(1965). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT (1967).
[Vol. 51456
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Two floor amendments deleted the phrases "to as good a condition
or use as prior to the disturbance."' I9 It was left to the legislature
to develop effective reclamation requirements and standards.4 °
In fairness to the committee, the work on the sections on
water, water rights, and agriculture was well done and with agree-
ment on most items. The committee recognized the importance of
both and tried hard to reach agreement. It recognized the impor-
tance of agriculture in the state's economy, and also that it was
losing its representation in legislative halls. As a result, agriculture
is one of two departments in state government that has constitu-
tional status. But, ironically, several delegates were heckled badly
at public meetings when they returned home and began to explain
article IX of the constitution to their rural constituents.
When the convention had finished with the article on natural
resources, President Leo Graybill told me I should not feel too dis-
appointed, that the article contained much more than I realized at
the time. Of course, he was right. 1 I had known early in the con-
vention that I needed help outside the committee. And at least
twenty of those attending the convention were committed to the
environment. Some were members of the Bill of Rights Committee.
Miles Romney, now deceased, brought the group together to dis-
cuss other strategies with me. The group assured me that the right
to a clean and healthful environment would be in the Bill of
Rights, even if it did not make it into the Natural Resources arti-
cle. To our great satisfaction, this right appears in both articles.
The constitution offers guidance. What it does not do is to
give the courage to some legislators to stand up for what is right,
or to protect us from our own avarice. If anyone thinks that the
issue of the environment will go away, he or she is foolish indeed.
The time for adversarial positions is past. We all breathe the same
air, we drink the same water, we eat the same food, and, ulti-
mately, we depend on the same earth. We must depend on our-
selves to see that the water is clean, the food is safe, the air is pure,
and the earth is renewed.
38. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 16, at 1276.
39. Id. at 1299.
40. Id.
41. Noted conservationist and public-land-law legal scholar Charles Wilkinson has
called the environmental provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution an "extraordinary
document" and "the single strongest statement of conservation philosophy" in "any state['s]
constitution" and "very likely, of any nation in the world." Wilkinson, supra note 1.
1990]
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During the winter of 1972, members of the local government
committee of the Montana Constitutional Convention debated and
formulated what was to become one of the most inspired articles of
a new Montana Constitution. The achievement of these men and
women' is that they incorporated both enduring governmental val-
ues and unique features in the state's basic law. As a result of their
work, an exceptionally well-conceived local government article con-
tinues to provide a basis for effective local government in
Montana.
Two recurring themes are present in the local government ar-
ticle. First, constitutional convention delegates gave local residents
wide discretion in designing and empowering their local govern-
ments. The delegates, representing communities from throughout
the state, were aware of the social, economic, and geographical dif-
ferences among the state's counties and municipalities. Because of
this diversity, delegates believed that the new state constitution
should allow maximum flexibility to local governments.
Secondly, convention delegates believed that the new constitu-
* This paper was presented as part of the Local Government Panel at the
Constitutional Symposium '89, November 16, 1989. Members of the panel included James
J. Lopach, moderator, Ann Mary Dussault, Kay Foster, C. Gordon Morris, James (Jim)
Patrick Nugent II, David J. Patterson and Donald R. Peoples.
** Assistant to President and Professor of Political Science, University of Montana;
Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1973.
1. The local government committee was comprised of Oscar L. Anderson (chairman),
Virginia H. Blend (vice chairman), Franklin Arness, George W. Rollins, M. Lynn Sparks,
Katie Payne, Thomas M. Ask, Marian S. Erdmann, Lucile Speer, Arnold W. Jacobsen, and
Clark E. Simon. Jerry Holloron was the research analyst, and Pat Romine was the secretary.
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tion should revitalize the critical political relationship between citi-
zens and local government officials. They wanted the enhanced au-
tonomy of local government-the article's first theme-to be
balanced by an enhanced accountability of municipal and county
officials to their constituents. The local government article, accord-
ingly, provided for several ways to guarantee the representative
quality of the state's local governments.
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
were not unrealistic about the efficacy of mere constitutional lan-
guage or the proper scope of local government authority. The pro-
ceedings of the convention demonstrate repeatedly that the dele-
gates were aware of the nature of a constitution: an outline of
principles adopted by the citizenry to serve as the basis for their
public life. The delegates knew that the legislature would have the
primary duty of providing the details to implement the spirit of
government found in these guidelines. Additionally, the delegates
knew that realizing the promise of the local government article
would require a creative and good-will partnership of the constitu-
tion, legislature, and local governments.
Today there is no doubt that Montana counties and munici-
palities face serious problems. But the lesson of two decades under
the local government article is that these problems stem from flaws
in the partnership of the legislature and local governments and not
from the local government article itself. The intent here is to argue
that the solutions to four problems-inflexible governmental struc-
ture, inadequate county powers, excessive limitations on self-gov-
ernment powers, and insufficient local revenue-lie more in local
and legislative politics than in constitutional revision.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
In 1972 little variety existed in the structure of Montana's lo-
cal governments. One hundred and twenty-four of the state's 126
municipalities (today there are 128 municipalities) were operating
under the mayor-council form of government (the exceptions were
Helena and Bozeman with manager forms). Fifty-five of the state's
fifty-six counties were organized under the commission form of
government. The one exception, Petroleum County, had a manager
system. Given the diversity of communities within the state, con-
stitutional convention delegates asked why local governmental
structures were not more varied. Their conclusion was that reform
had been frustrated in the past by forms of government that fa-
vored inaction, by status-quo oriented local government officials,
and by the lack of a review process that had a built-in reform bias.
1990]
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The delegates' response was a call for a wide range of legislatively
provided local government forms, a reform process that repre-
sented a balance between state mandate and local initiative, and
several provisions that facilitated local government consolidation.2
In article XI, section 3, entitled "Forms of government," the
state constitution directs the legislature to "provide such optional
or alternative forms of government that each unit or combination
of units may adopt, amend, or abandon ... by a majority of those
voting on the question." The delegates' intent was clear: "The pro-
posal aims at creating the widest possible array of local govern-
ment forms so that local structure may be tailored to local needs"'
Article XI provides even greater structural flexibility in section 5,
which is entitled "Self-government charters." A charter, as the
other optional forms, describes the legislative and executive
branches of local government and determines the degree of separa-
tion between them. With a charter, however, local residents and
not state legislators are responsible for the designing and drafting.
The delegates anticipated that charter writing would allow "a lo-
cality to tailor its governmental structure to its own needs and of-
fers an excellent method whereby more people can become directly
involved in their government."4
The Montana Legislature's response to the constitution's man-
dates concerning optional forms and charter writing was quick and
complete. The 1975 Legislature made available to counties and
municipalities perhaps the widest choice of forms that exists in
any state. Local governments may choose from among five optional
forms, each of which can be modified by an array of secondary fea-
tures. The sixth plan of government available to any local govern-
ment in the state is the charter form.
The five optional forms of local government are: commission-
executive, commission-manager, commission, commission-chair-
man, and town meeting. Each of these optional forms includes a
number of structural sub-options that can be used in various com-
binations to modify the basic form of government. For example,
one community might choose to elect certain officials, and another
community might prefer to have those same officials appointed.
Communities can decide to have either partisan or non-partisan
elections. Citizens can decide for themselves how many members
2. See J. LOPACH & L. McKINSEY, HANDBOOK OF MONTANA FORMS OF LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT (1975) for a full discussion of the convention's treatment of these issues.
3. VII MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 2512 (1972) (Delegate Vir-
ginia Blend addressing the general convention) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS].
4. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 3, at 796 (Report of Local Government Committee).
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should be in the legislative body. By combining the various struc-
tural sub-options5 with one of the five optional forms, a community
can modify its government to suit its needs.
The commission-executive form6 is the most familiar plan of
government that Montana municipalities and counties can adopt
because of its extensive use in the state as the mayor-alderman
form. Its familiarity is also due to the fact that the national and
Montana governments resemble the commission-executive form.
The essence of the form is an elected legislative body called the
commission and an elected single chief executive. The choice of
structural sub-options allows variations of the form ranging be-
tween the "weak mayor" and the "strong mayor" forms.
The commission-manager form7 has been the frequent object
of reformers in Montana and throughout the nation. The form con-
sists of an elected commission (often, but not necessarily, having a
small number of members elected at-large in non-partisan elec-
tions for overlapping terms) and a manager appointed by the com-
mission on the basis of merit for an indefinite term. The aim of the
form is to increase the chances that governmental power will rest
in the hands of a few competent persons. The basic rationale of the
form is strict separation between policy-making and administrative
functions.
The commission forms is primarily a county phenomenon both
in Montana and the nation as a whole. Unification-not separa-
tion-of powers is the form's principal theme.' The plan locates in
the elected commissioners all legislative, executive, and adminis-
trative powers and duties. Structural sub-options allow a county to
reconstruct the traditional Montana plan of fourteen elected ad-
ministrative officials.9 The commission plan is the most criticized
form of government because it exhibits characteristically little pol-
icy leadership, poor administrative coordination, and limited ac-
countability to the electorate.
The commission-chairman form10  is virtually unknown
5. There are twelve structural sub-options, but not all of them are available to mod-
ify each of the five optional forms. The sub-options are: partisan or non-partisan election of
officers, length of term of elected officers, presiding officer of the legislative body, concurrent
or overlapping terms of office, budget authority of chief executive, appointment power of
chief executive, veto power of chief executive, appointment of administrative assistants, se-
lection process for chief administrative officers, district or at-large commissioner elections,
size of legislative body, and use of community councils to advise the legislative body.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. §8 7-3-201 to -224 (1989).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-301 to -318 (1989).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-401 to -442 (1989).
9. See MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 3(2).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-501 to -517 (1989).
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throughout the United States. Its identifying characteristic is its
partial fusion of legislative and executive powers, as is the practice
under a parliamentary government. An elected commission selects
a commission chairman from among its membership. The chair-
man has the powers of a strong chief executive and serves at the
commission's pleasure. The chairman is similar to a prime minister
because both officials have executive and legislative powers.
The town meeting optional form 1 is essentially the plan of
government that has been used in some New England communities
for at least 200 years. Its theme is direct democracy. The "town
meeting" itself is an assembly of all the qualified voters of a town
(the Montana Legislature has restricted town meeting government
to municipalities of less than 2,000 persons). An annual town meet-
ing enacts ordinances, levies taxes, and selects the town chairman
(executive) and town meeting moderator.
The charter form 2 of government in Montana, like the five
optional forms, describes a community's governmental organiza-
tion. In this instance, however, the authors of the form are local
residents and not legislators. If a community does not envision
what it wants in the legislatively provided optional forms and
structural sub-options, it can design its own government from
scratch. The constitutional convention delegates provided that
"[c]harter provisions establishing executive, legislative, and admin-
istrative structure and organization are superior to statutory
provisions.,13
Convention delegates anticipated that the initial and ordinary
way for achieving structural reform of local governments would be
a mandated and decennial process called "voter review of local
government," provided for in article XI, section 9. A national ob-
server of local government found the voter review process to be
unique and engaging:
There has never been anything quite like it in American history:
popularly elected study commissions, functioning as mini-consti-
tutional conventions in each of the state's 182 counties and mu-
nicipalities .... Perhaps the most surprising thing about Mon-
tana's broad-scale reform effort is that it's taking place at all. The
state was once the province of rapacious copper kings and later
the private satrapy of the Anaconda Copper Company .... "'
The legislature performed admirably again in this area of con-
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-601 to -613 (1989).
12. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-701 to -709 (1989).
13. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 5(3).
14. Sunday Sun-Times, June 13, 1976, at 38, col. 1.
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stitutional implementation, allowing voter review of local govern-
ment to become the citizen-dominated process envisioned by the
constitutional convention. The legislature provided that the mem-
bership of each local government study commission would be from
three to nine and elected. In 1974, during the first cycle of voter
review, more than 700 persons filed for the 642 study commissioner
positions on the 182 study commissions. Few study commissions
ultimately proposed minor structural reforms. Seventy-one percent
of the county proposals and fifty-three percent of the municipal
proposals contained major reforms. In 1976 voters adopted four
county and twenty-seven municipal reorganization proposals.
15
After the first round of voter review of local government was
completed in 1976, a discussion began that the review process was
a waste of time and money in many communities, and that its ob-
servance every ten years should be optional rather than
mandatory. This sentiment culminated in ratification of a constitu-
tional amendment in 1978. It provided that, in 1984 and every ten
years thereafter, residents of each Montana county and municipal-
ity would vote whether to have a study commission.
Despite the amendment's enhancement of local discretion in
the voter review process, a surprisingly high fifty-four percent of
the state's local governments (twenty-five of fifty-six counties and
seventy-three of 128 municipalities) voted in 1984 to have a study
commission. 16 Study commission size ranged from three to nine
members, and there were in total 364 study commission positions
and 414 filings by candidates. Many study commissions made use
of the legislature's newly provided option of "no recommenda-
tion. 1' 7 Fifty-two percent of the county study commissions and
sixty-three percent of the municipal study commissions decided
that no reform was needed and terminated the review process
short of a referendum. The 1986 referenda outcomes were similar
to the 1976 experience. The success rate in both instances was sev-
enteen percent (seventeen adoptions among ninety-eight study
commissions in 1986 and thirty-one adoptions among 182 local
governments in 1976).
The two cycles of voter review of local government appear to
have realized the aims of constitutional convention delegates. Hun-
dreds of local residents became directly and intensely involved in
15. See L. McKINSEY & J. LOPACH, A STATE MANDATES LocAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW:
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE (1979) for a complete analysis of the 1976 voter review process.
16. See Lopach, Voter Review of Local Government, 76 NAT'L Civic REV. 501-03
(1987) for a more complete analysis of the 1986 voter review process.
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-3-185 (1989).
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questions of government. Many communities made what they
thought were needed changes in their governmental systems. To-
day, as the following table indicates, far more variety exists in local
government structure18 than in 1972:
Municipalities
Charter form 13
Commission executive form 109
Commission manager form 4
Commission chairman form 2
Counties
Charter form 2
Commission executive form 0
Commission manager form 1
Commission form 53
The voter review process, as designed by the constitutional con-
vention and implemented by the state legislature, has provided the
opportunity for structural flexibility in Montana's local govern-
ments. Structural reform has become, in fact, a frequently used
prerogative of local communities. On this score, no constitutional
revision is needed today.
Besides providing for increased flexibility concerning local
government forms, the constitutional convention also sought to
make structural consolidation easier to achieve for local govern-
ments. Section 2 of article XI reads: "No county boundary may be
changed or county seat transferred until approved by a majority of
those voting on the question in each county affected." The 1889
Constitution contained a more difficult county consolidation proce-
dure that required the approval of a majority of qualified elec-
tors.1 9 Section 3 of the local government article mandates the legis-
lature to provide procedures whereby local government units can
alter their boundaries by "merging, consolidating, and dissolving
such units." The legislature responded by permitting each of these
18. Montana's thirteen municipalities and two counties with charter forms are: Ana-
conda-Deer Lodge County (manager), Butte-Silver Bow County (commission-executive),
Ennis (commission-executive), Helena (manager), Billings (manager), Bridger (commission-
executive), Circle (commission-executive), Whitefish (manager), West Yellowstone (commis-
sion-executive), Belgrade (manager), Great Falls (manager), and Troy (commission-execu-
tive). The five communities that have adopted a commission-manager form provided by the
legislature are Bozeman, Miles City, Livingston, Kalispell, and Petroleum County. The com-
mission-chairman form organizes the municipalities of Broadview and Virginia City. No
Montana town has a town meeting, but in 1976 seven municipalities rejected reform propos-
als for that plan of government: Manhattan, Eureka, Rexford, Valier, Terry, Outlook, and
Judith Gap.
19. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XVI, § 8.
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radical structural reforms to be accomplished by direct initiative 0
or by study commission recommendation and popular vote during
voter review of local government. 21 The constitutional convention
also envisioned forms of local government cooperation short of dis-
incorporation, city-county consolidation, and county merger. Sec-
tion 7, "Intergovernmental cooperation," directly authorizes all lo-
cal governments to enter into agreements with each other for
service transfers and consolidations or any other kind of functional
cooperation.
Montana's record concerning total local government consolida-
tion since 1972 is amazing, to say the least. There has been consoli-
dation activity in the three "Montana cases where consolidation is
most suited," and electoral success in two of these communities.22
Butte-Silver Bow County and Anaconda-Deer Lodge County ap-
proved consolidation plans in 1976, and Missoula-Missoula County
rejected consolidation in 1976 and in 1983. In 1976, the Billings
study commission voted four-three against pursuing consolidation
after the county study commission had favored merger by a three-
two vote. The Montana record is noteworthy because the majority
of consolidation plans requiring voter approval are rejected by
voters.23
One assessment of city-county consolidation in Montana at-
tributed the state's high rate of merger success to the "facilitative
advantage" of the voter review process: "There is little reason to
believe that any of these localities would be trying consolidation
otherwise even though consolidation has been available since
1923. ''2" The dynamics of the voter review process that were espe-
cially instrumental in the "smaller size of the Montana communi-
ties" included the study commissions' citizen membership, wide
discretion to design a reform plan, and tailoring the reform plan to
specific community problems.25
Assessments of the consolidation plans in operation have also
been highly favorable. The former executive of Butte-Silver Bow
believes that consolidation created a "low-cost government with
excellent services. Tax savings have been immense, and employ-
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-3-141 (1989).
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-3-185 (1989).
22. L. McKinsey, Montana Voter Review: The Case for City-County Consolidation at
19 (April 29, 1976) (paper presented at the Western Social Science Association annual con-
vention, Tempe, Arizona).
23. Id. at 9.
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ment was reduced through attrition from 600 to 325. '26 The gov-
ernment of Anaconda-Deer Lodge County had lost seventy-five
percent of taxable valuation but today is able to provide adequate
services because of consolidation. In 1982, an Anaconda-Deer
Lodge majority of 2500 to 1013 voted against a proposal to return
to separate city and county governments. "The support for consoli-
dation had increased from fifty-six percent in favor in 1976 to sev-
enty-one percent in favor in 1982. ' 7
City-county consolidation most likely will not occur elsewhere
in Montana because of community characteristics, rather than le-
gal obstacles. Counties other than Silver Bow and Deer Lodge are
larger in area, have multiple population centers, and have greater
opposition to consolidation in outlying areas.2 Partial consolida-
tion, however, has been successfully implemented by many com-
munities in the state. In 1976, during voter review of local govern-
ment, three sets of governments adopted some form of law
enforcement consolidation or transfer. They were Hardin and Big
Horn County, Scobey and Daniels County, and White Sulphur and
Meagher County. Other Montana communities that have entered
into joint law enforcement agreements are Shelby and Toole
County, Harlowton and Wheatland County, Cut Bank and Glacier
County, Forsyth and Rosebud County, and Wolf Point and
Roosevelt County. Many other local governments have service
agreements covering areas other than law enforcement-for exam-
ple, snow plowing, road maintenance, welfare, and court adminis-
tration.2 9 The consensus of Montana local government officials is
that the existing constitutional and statutory framework promotes
interlocal cooperation."
26. Address by Don Peoples, Taft Seminar Presentation, University of Montana (July
7, 1989) [hereinafter Peoples].
27. K. WEAVER & J. MATHRE, MONTANA'S VOTER REVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF 1976 AND 1986 33 (1986) [hereinafter WEAVER & MATHRE].
28. Interview with Alec Hansen, Executive Director, Montana League of Cities and
Towns (Aug. 16, 1989).
29. Interview with Gordon Morris, Executive Director, Montana Association of Coun-
ties (Aug. 18, 1989).
30. One exception to the generosity of the MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED in promoting
service agreements among local governments is § 7-11-1102, concerning multijurisdictional
service areas. The legislature here limits, as allowed by MONTANA CONSTITUTION, art. XI, sec.
7(1), the use of multijurisdictional service areas to recreation, road and highway mainte-
nance, jails, libraries, and animal control. The statute would not allow the city of Missoula,
for example, to enter into a fire protection agreement with a rural fire district. Interview
with Mike Sehestedt, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Missoula County (Aug. 22, 1989).
[Vol. 51
18




The traditional configuration of local governments in Montana
was typical and common-sensical. Municipalities, or incorporated
cities and towns, were true local governments in that they were
formed by residents to provide governance and services to defined
areas of relatively high population density. At the request of the
local population, the state granted a charter of incorporation that
empowered the municipality to tackle its problems and provided a
governmental structure befitting these ordinance-making powers.
Counties were the other principal part of Montana local gov-
ernment, but ironically they were not designed to be true local gov-
ernments. The state government created counties to help it admin-
ister important state duties and services outside of the capital. The
sole function of county governments was administrative; they
lacked the ordinance-making function of municipalities. County
commissioners and the other elected county officials-clerk and re-
corder, clerk of district court, county attorney, sheriff, treasurer,
surveyor, county superintendent of schools, assessor, coroner, and
public administrator-assisted the state in such functions as elec-
tions, recording vital statistics, adjudicating, prosecuting, collecting
taxes, maintaining roads, and collecting and transmitting informa-
tion needed in Helena.
In the middle of the twentieth century, a new phrase entered
the jargon of local government practitioners and students. "Urban
county" was the description given a county government whose citi-
zens were requesting it to be more than an administrative arm of
the state. The situation was easy to understand. Population growth
occurred outside of the boundary of a municipality, and residents
of the new urban area had the same desires for governmental ser-
vices as the urban residents of the municipality. To get these ser-
vices they had several options. They could ask to be annexed to an
existing municipality-a local government empowered and organ-
ized to see to the public needs of urban residents-or incorporate
themselves as a new municipality. They could form a separate spe-
cial district, a substantially independent governmental entity, for
each service desired. Or they could ask the county government to
respond to their needs.
At different times, county residents used all of these options.
They sought help from their county commissioners frequently
enough, however, to put the county commissioners in the frame of
mind of mayors and city council members. Why should county
elected officials not have the power to regulate traffic, establish
recreation areas, restrict shooting guns, and provide sanitation ser-
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vices? County commissioners from urban counties requested such
authority from the Montana Legislature, which responded in a way
befitting the counties' traditional status. The legislature in a piece-
meal fashion authorized counties to address urban problems but
only in the manner detailed in the legislative authorization.
Whereas each municipality could use its ordinance-making power
to implement as it chose a general legislative grant of power, each
county had to administer a program exactly as the legislature
dictated.
This is the situation that confronted the delegates to the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention. They heard arguments that
counties should become true local governments, freed from the pa-
ternalistic supervision of the legislature and granted the liberating
discretion of ordinance-making powers. The convention's resolu-
tion of the matter was its adoption of section 4(1)(b) in article XI:
"A county has legislative, administrative, and other powers pro-
vided or implied by law." Rather than taking the direct and full
step of equating counties with municipalities in the language of the
constitution, the convention left the question of whether to extend
ordinance-making powers to counties to the judgment of the legis-
lature. Subsequent to this authorization, the legislature has chosen
not to act. The consensus among local government law experts in
the state is that only in the area of animal control has the legisla-
ture directly provided counties with ordinance-making power.3 1 An
example of an implied grant of county legislative power is regula-
tion of air pollution.
Since the ratification of the 1972 Montana Constitution, com-
missioners of urban counties and the Montana Association of
Counties have sought a systematic grant of legislative powers to
counties. The principal battlegrounds were the 1977 and 1979 Leg-
islatures, where a proposal to authorize county ordinance-making
power was part of a massive reform measure that would have made
county governments akin to municipalities. The failure of the legis-
lature during the 1977 and 1979 sessions and thereafter to raise
counties to the status of true local governments raises the question
of whether this step should be taken constitutionally. Analysis of
the legislative battles will be instructive in formulating an answer.
House Bill 122, taken up by the 1977 Montana Legislature,
was a complete revision and recodification of local government law.
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of Representatives, and widely termed a "monster" by legislators.2
It was the largest bill the Montana Legislature ever handled.3 In
1977 the House of Representatives gave majority approval to the
bill after the transmittal deadline, but the Senate failed to give the
bill the necessary two-thirds approval for consideration. The legis-
lature then established an interim committee to study House Bill
122. After months of study, the committee separated the original
bill into thirteen separate bills-"pups of HB 122"-but voted
seven to five to urge the 1979 Legislature to reject the measures.3 '
That session of the Montana Legislature complied with the interim
committee's recommendation.
Both the parent bill and its offspring would have broadened
the power of local governments in general and would have signifi-
cantly broadened the power of counties. The proposed local gov-
ernment code would have given municipalities and counties the
"same authority to deliver services. ' ' 5 For many services, county
power would have been far in excess of the power municipalities
then possessed. The code also specified certain services that coun-
ties would have the "first option to provide. '3 The code proposed
that each county and municipality be authorized "to determine its
own administrative organization by ordinance. '37 Then counties
would have been able to bring existing and future boards, commis-
sions, and service districts within the county's administrative
structure. County duties mandated by the state would have been
"made a responsibility of the county rather than a responsibility of
a particular county office." 38 The county commission by ordinance
then could have determined how many or how few positions were
necessary for carrying out these responsibilities. The governing
body of all general power counties would have been given complete
discretion to design their internal departmental structure and
"eight methods" for delivering each authorized service. House Bill
122 would have switched counties from thirty-eight single-purpose
mill levies to an all-purpose levy for property taxation and author-
ized five new taxes to be adopted at the option of the counties.
Finally, the proposed code would have implemented "in a system-
atic fashion" the constitution's authorization of county legislative
32. Missoulian, March 20, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
33. Great Falls Tribune, March 9, 1977, at 1, col 1.
34, Great Falls Tribune, January 17, 1979 at 35, col. 1-2.
35. Wanzenried, Analysis of the Proposed Montana Local Government Code, 4 LocAL
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powers.39
The proposed local government code met defeat in 1977 and
1979 for several reasons, most of which are still pertinent to the
discussion of enhanced county powers. There is substantial irony
in the fact that the proposed code was drafted by the State Com-
mission on Local Government, the body that had drafted the legis-
lation to implement the optional forms, charter writing, and voter
review provisions of the 1972 Constitution. These earlier measures
respected religiously the local government article's theme of citizen
involvement and local control. A principal criticism of House Bill
122 was that it sought to impose significant reforms on counties
that had been rejected just a year previously by local government
study commissions and county electorates. Senator William Mur-
ray of Missoula was quoted as saying: "'The arrogance of the lan-
guage of this bill is almost unbelievable'" because it "forces
changes already turned down by voters during the state's first
mandatory local government review."'40 Senator Ed Smith of
Dagmar made the same point when he said "he refuse[d] to go
home and tell his constituents they didn't know what they were
doing when they turned down changes in their local government by
a 3-to-1 margin last year."41 The lesson is that Montanans have
already constitutionally reserved to local communities the right to
reform in a major way county governments. The legislature has
respected this prerogative, and there is no reason for such a basic
principle to be overridden constitutionally.
Another reason for the defeat of the proposed local govern-
ment code was that it would have effectuated a major reform of
county powers without an accompanying reform of county govern-
mental structure. In 1977 two House members, Representatives
Jack Ramirez of Billings and R. Budd Gould of Missoula, "criti-
cized the bill for granting 'tremendous power' to the county com-
mission form of government." '42 The same criticism was made two
years later in the interim study committee: "The majority objected
to the code's elimination of the historic distinctions between the
powers of municipalities and counties and particularly opposed the
granting of ordinance-making powers to county commissioners,
claiming it would give most county governments the power to both
pass and carry out laws." '43 The 1975 Legislature, at the urging of
39. Id.
40. Missoulian, March 20, 1977, at 2, col. 1.
41. Id.
42. Great Falls Tribune, February 20, 1977, at 2, col. 2.
43. Great Falls Tribune, January 12, 1979, at 5, col. 3.
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the State Commission on Local Government, had denied the exer-
cise of self-government powers to local governments organized
under the commission form. In 1977 the Commission set aside the
principle of separation of powers when it insisted that all counties,
most of which still used the commission form, should be given
broad ordinance-making powers. The same anomaly would exist if
the state constitution were to grant legislative power directly to all
counties.
The interim study committee's other criticism is probably the
key argument against wholesale extension of ordinance-making
power to counties, whether by the legislature or by the constitu-
tion. The committee wanted to preserve the historic distinction be-
tween county government and municipal government. The crux of
the issue is presented succinctly by Missoula City Attorney Jim
Nugent: "The correct response to the question of enhanced county
powers is, what, then, is the point of municipalities-why create
two similarly empowered governments with jurisdiction over the
same area."" At least in Montana, it is still good public policy to
retain the identity of counties as administrative arms of the state
and rural governments and the identity of municipalities as urban
governments. Where counties need ordinance-making power to
handle problems and no other solution makes good sense, the legis-
lature can respond with limited authorizations in a case-by-case
fashion. Where residents of urban areas just outside of the bound-
ary of a municipality seek a governmental response to their needs,
county officials can recommend that the residents seek annexation
to-the municipality. To facilitate annexation, it is highly arguable
that the state constitution should include the principle of expedi-
tious and unimpeded annexation and mandate its implementation
by the legislature.
The long-sought remedy of county empowerment has a serious
flaw. It would increasingly bring about the prevalent problems of
American urban government: overlapping government, duplicated
services, and inequitable taxation. Why does the urban area need
two local legislative bodies? Why should the urban area have two
law enforcement agencies? Why should municipal residents be the
sole-providers of city streets, traffic control, and parks that are also
enjoyed by non-tax paying urban residents? Across-the-board ex-
tension of ordinance-making power to counties would lead to even
greater pressure for total or partial governmental consolidation
and interlocal agreements. Eventually, constitutionally mandated
44. Interview with Jim Nugent, Missoula City Attorney (Aug. 24, 1989).
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consolidation in some instances would make sense, but its ratifica-
tion would be politically impossible because it would violate so
profoundly the Montana Constitution's basic principle of local de-
termination. On the other hand, constitutional status for a facilita-
tive annexation policy would not be as violative of the basic princi-
ples of the local government article. By choosing to live in an
urban area, residents have voluntarily surrendered their option of
living under a rural government. And an annexation amendment
would give constitutional status to the principles of community
and equity.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON SELF-GOVERNMENT POWERS
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
did provide for enhanced county and municipal powers in a way
that was in line with their overarching principle of local determina-
tion. The goal of the convention, a delegate said, was "to provide
options of self-determination by local government, whether in a
town of 25 people or a city of 80,000, whether in a county of under
500 or a county of eighty or ninety thousand."' The convention's
principal vehicle for achieving local determination was Section 6 of
the local government article, "Self-government powers." It reads:
A local government unit adopting a self-government charter may
exercise any power not prohibited by this constitution, law, or
charter. This grant of self-government powers may be extended to
other local government units through optional forms of govern-
ment provided for in section 3.I "
Very little debate in the constitutional convention was de-
voted to self-government powers. Restricting self-government pow-
ers to a narrow category of local units was barely mentioned. The
discussion that did occur centered on how self-government units
might use their power and what limitations on self-government
units the legislature might eventually impose. Fear of "little city-
states" 17 that would "enact right-to-work laws and sales taxes, per-
mit wide-open gambling, prostitution, drug sales, and one thing or
another of that character" was expressed.' 8 To the question,
"What's to stop them?" a proponent replied: "I think that the
Legislature is the battleground for these things."''
45. VII TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 3, at 2513 (Delegate Virginia Blend addressing the
general convention).
46. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
47. See VII TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 3, at 2531 (Delegate Arness speaking).
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The actions of the Montana Legislature several years later
gave little indication of diminished reform fervor. The 1974 assem-
bly provided that self-government powers would be made available
to each of the state's counties and municipalities. The first oppor-
tunity for adoption would be in 1976 during voter review of local
government. The legislature authorized self-government powers to
be proposed in two ways. A locally written charter automatically
would include self-government powers, and four of the five op-
tional forms provided by the legislature (not the commission form
because it lacked separation of powers) could be proposed with ei-
ther self-government or general government (Dillon's Rule)
powers6 0
The 1975 Montana Legislature completed its task of imple-
menting the constitutional home rule provision by determining the
extent of self-government powers. The constitutional convention
had placed Montana in the ranks of a handful of states which had
adopted the shared or residual powers approach to home rule. In
deciding which governmental powers would be "prohibited" to
self-government units, the legislature gave the constitutional term
a broad definition. It identified four categories of statutory
restrictions.
Outright denial was the first type of prohibition. Some govern-
mental functions were viewed as belonging strictly to the state as,
for example, defining criminal activity, regulating utilities and
common carriers, and determining the environmental compatibility
of major industrial facilities. The legislature specifically precluded
the entry of self-government units into these and other fields.
Second, the legislature said that certain specified powers could
be exercised only pursuant to an express legislative delegation. The
rationale for this category of prohibition was that the nature of
some admittedly local powers required that they be exercised uni-
formly; harmony could be achieved only through state grants of
power. Included in this set of delegated powers were local sales and
income taxes, extraterritorial powers, local judicial functions, and
regulation of gambling. Legislators appeared not to have appreci-
ated the irony of their tempering the residual powers doctrine with
its theoretical opposite, Dillon's Rule.
50. J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, (5th ed.)
(1911). Dillon's Rule of local government powers, formulated by judge and commentator
John F. Dillon, stated that local governments possess only the powers expressly granted by
the legislature; any doubt about the existence of a power should be resolved by the courts
against the local government. Montana courts strictly followed this formulation until ratifi-
cation of the 1972 Constitution.
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The third category of prohibited powers involved concurrent
state and local activities. The Montana Legislature required con-
sistency in regulation in areas where both the state and self-gov-
ernment units have a legitimate interest and are actively involved.
Active involvement of the state existed "if a state agency or officer
is directed to establish administrative rules governing the matter
or if enforcement of standards or requirements established by stat-
ute is vested in a state officer or agency." 51 The legislature permit-
ted a self-government unit to act concurrently with the state as
long as its standards or requirements would not be lower than the
state's. A self-government unit, for example, could require a higher
level of air quality than the state, but it could not undermine
clearly enunciated state standards.
Mandatory provisions were the final kind of limitation that
the 1975 Montana Legislature placed on self-government units.
The rationale for these requirements differed from provision to
provision. Some mandates were duties that all local government
units were required to perform as agents of the state as, for exam-
ple, conducting the election of local officials. Other mandatory pro-
visions were obligations that the state, pursuant to the 1972 Con-
stitution, imposed on all units of local government. Included here
were voter review of local government and regulations concerning
accounting procedures, debt limit, and investment of local funds.
Other mandatory provisions were justified as being necessary to
protect citizens from arbitrary local government action. Adopted
by reference and placed in this category of prohibited powers were
regulations covering annexation, disincorporation, consolidation,
ordinance-making procedures, planning and zoning, and eminent
domain.
The legislature also included some general language in the
"mandatory provisions" section of the self-government code that
was potentially troublesome. This was: "Any law directing or re-
quiring a local government or any officer or employee of a local
government to carry out any function or provide any service. '52
Fears that some state law enacted prior to 1972 would be applied
to self-government units via this provision were reasonable. The
legislature arguably meant to head off such a development by dis-
tinguishing services mandated of all local governments from ser-
vices a self-government unit elects to provide:
A local government unit with self-government powers which
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-113(3) (1989).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(1)(f) (1989).
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elects to provide a service or perform a function that may also be
provided or performed by a general power government unit is not
subject to any limitation in the provision of that service or per-
formance of that function except such limitations as are con-
tained in its charter or in state law specifically applicable to self-
government units.53
The legislature made a further declaration that should have been
sufficient for resolving any ambiguity created by Montana Code
Annotated Sections 7-1-114(1)(f) and 7-1-103. The legislature in-
structed judges to favor self-government units in close cases:
The powers and authority of a local government unit with self-
government powers shall be liberally construed. Every reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a local government power or author-
ity shall be resolved in favor of the existence of that power or
authority.
54
Today there are twenty-three local government units in Mon-
tana that have self-government powers. The vehicles for these
adoptions were either the two cycles of voter review of local gov-
ernment or locally initiated procedures. In thirteen instances, com-
munities wrote self-government charters. In ten instances, commu-
nities adopted an optional form to which was attached self-
government powers. The charter communities are Anaconda-Deer
Lodge County (1976), Butte-Silver Bow County (1976), Ennis
(1976), Helena (1976), Billings (1976), Bridger (1976), Circle
(1976), Sunburst (1976), Whitefish (1980), West Yellowstone
(1980), Belgrade (1986), Great Falls (1986), and Troy (1987). Pop-
lar and Madison County also adopted self-government charters in
1976, but both have since rescinded that action. The ten communi-
ties that added self-government powers to their forms of govern-
ment are: Broadview, Browning, Clyde Park, Fort Peck, Fromberg,
Glasgow, Hingham, Neihart, Red Lodge, and Virginia City.
Some self-government communities have experienced a por-
tion of the local determination that constitutional convention dele-
gates expected. Butte's movement from twenty percent unemploy-
ment in 1983 when the Anaconda Company suspended operations
to six percent unemployment in 1989 was "enabled by self-govern-
ment powers" in the judgment of Don Peoples, former Butte-Silver
Bow executive: "Self-government powers are a catalyst, and Butte
hasn't used them to the degree they should be used. It is abso-
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (1989) (emphasis added).
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-106 (1989).
1990]
27
Cross: The Battle for the Environmental Provisions in Montana's 1972 Constitution
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
lutely desirable to have them." 55 In Troy, self-government powers
permitted the city to purchase an electric utility company, buy
power from the Bonneville Power Administration, and market
electricity to its new customers.5 6 Helena was enabled by self-gov-
ernment powers to construct a parking garage without first seeking
legislative authorization.
Even general government units have benefited indirectly from
the pioneering actions of self-government units. The 1979 Montana
Legislature enacted Senate Bill 503 which permitted each local
government to charge a fee for any authorized service it provides.
The legislature's eye had been caught by the fee-setting practice of
Madison County, then a self-government unit. The legislature in
1981 passed Senate Bill 96 which authorized all local governments
to adopt a five percent charge for reviewing special improvement
districts. The legislature's model was Helena's regulatory program,
adopted pursuant to self-government powers.
Not all self-government communities have proceeded with the
vigor of Butte and Helena. In 1977 a survey of self-government
units found a good deal of misunderstanding and apathy. Only
three of the eighteen governments contacted had passed self-gov-
ernment ordinances. In one instance, the chair of the governing
body said that self-government powers had been exercised on six-
teen separate occasions; the chief executive of the same govern-
ment said that self-governing powers were yet to be used. A coun-
cilman in another self-government unit denied that his town had
home rule.5 Twelve years later some self-government units remain
hesitant to use their enhanced ordinance-making discretion. Bel-
grade, for example, delayed departing from a forty-five hour work
week in its city hall until the 1989 Legislature permitted all third-
class cities to set their own hours. Such legislative dependency in
routine matters was exactly what self-government powers were
designed to eliminate.58 In Great Falls, the city commission has not
used self-government powers since they became effective in 1986.
The commission has been essentially conservative, not viewing city
problems as opportunities to implement self-government powers. 9
The reluctance of some self-government units to act more vig-
orously does not stem principally from legislatively created
55. Peoples, supra note 26.
56. WEAVER & MATHRE, supra note 27, at 39.
57. J. Lopach, Implementation of Self-Government Powers in the State of Montana
(Nov. 14, 1977) (paper presented to the National Conference on Government, Denver,
Colorado).
58. Interview with Mark Bordsen, Belgrade City Manager, (Aug. 24, 1989).
59. Interview with David Gliko, Great Falls City Attorney (Sept. 22, 1989).
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prohibitions or ambiguity. The legislature, acting as the supreme
partner under the residual home rule approach, was perfectly cor-
rect in declaring the prohibitions it did. The legislature, though,
could have done more to clarify to what degree legislation enacted
prior to 1975 limited the self-government units. This was a goal of
House Bill 122, the massive recodification of local government law
proposed in 1977. It would have sharply distinguished the authori-
zations for general powers units from the limitations on self-gov-
ernment units to prevent judges from interpreting general powers
grants as prohibitions on self-government powers.
Because the legislature failed to complete its job, it fell to the
Montana Supreme Court. The justices have had many opportuni-
ties to clarify and preserve the intent of the constitutional conven-
tion and legislature for home rule. Billings alone found itself in the
supreme court on six occasions when it tried to use its self-govern-
ment powers. The following evaluation of the justices' performance
is both commendatory and critical.
Since self-government units began to implement their powers,
the supreme court has decided at least nine cases that turned upon
statutory and constitutional language concerning home rule.60 In
four of these cases the court upheld the action of the self-govern-
ment unit.6 1 In the remaining five cases the court voided the local
government activity.2 Judgment of the court's role, however,
should not turn solely on the court's disposition of these nine
cases. It should be based primarily on the court's support in its
opinions of the constitutional convention's and legislature's intent.
It is clear that the constitutional convention and legislature
wanted to give home rule units a boost in their governing discre-
tion and yet maintain the legislature's supremacy in defining the
60. State ex rel. Swart v. Molitor, 190 Mont. 515, 621 P.2d 1100 (1981); Billings
Firefighters Local 521 v. City of Billings, 214 Mont. 481, 694 P.2d 1335 (1985); Tipco Corp.
v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982); D. & F. Sanitation Serv. v. City of
Billings, 219 Mont. 437, 713 P.2d 977 (1986); Montana Innkeepers Assoc. v. City of Billings,
206 Mont. 425, 671 P.2d 21 (1983); Brueggemann v. City of Billings, 221 Mont. 375, 719
P.2d 768 (1986); Clopton v. Madison County Comm'n, 216 Mont. 335, 701 P.2d 347 (1985);
Diefenderfer v. City of Billings, 223 Mont. 487, 726 P.2d 1362 (1986); Harlem, Thompson, &
Parish v. City of Helena, 208 Mont. 45, 676 P.2d 191 (1984).
61. State of Montana ex rel. Swart v. Montana, 190 Mont. 515, 621 P.2d 1100 (1981);
Billings Firefighters Local 521 v. City of Billings, 214 Mont. 481, 694 P.2d 1335 (1985); D. &
F. Sanitation Serv. v. City of Billings, 219 Mont. 437, 713 P.2d 977 (1986); Diefenderfer v.
City of Billings, 223 Mont. 487, 726 P.2d 1362 (1986).
62. Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982); Montana
Innkeepers Assoc. v. City of Billings, 206 Mont. 425, 671 P.2d 21 (1983); Brueggeman v. City
of Billings, 221 Mont. 375, 719 P.2d 768 (1986); Clopton v. Madison County Comm'n, 216
Mont. 335, 701 P.2d 347 (1985); Harlem, Thompson, & Parish v. City of Helena, 208 Mont.
45, 676 P.2d 191 (1984).
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scope of local authority. The legislature's approach was to set out
the four categories of prohibitions on self-government units, pro-
vide that limitations on general powers government would not be
applicable, and provide that self-government powers should be lib-
erally construed. The Montana Supreme Court deserves praise to
the degree that its constitutional and statutory interpretations de-
veloped a clear framework for the guidance of local governments.
In seven of the nine self-government powers cases, the court pro-
vided this kind of guidance. 3 In two cases it created unnecessary
but not disastrous confusion. 4
The Montana Supreme Court did not start out well in its first
self-government powers case. In State of Montana ex rel. Swart v.
Molitor65 the court upheld a Madison County ordinance and ac-
companying fee requiring that final subdivision plats and certifi-
cates of survey be reviewed for errors and omissions by a land sur-
veyor. The question before the court was whether Madison County
was mandated by the state to do otherwise: "does the fact that a
self-governing unit is mandatorily subject to laws which regulate
planning and zoning preclude the unit from prescribing a fee for
reviewing certificates of survey where the state statutes are silent
on the subject. ' 66 The pertinent language in state law was: "A local
government with self-government powers is subject to the follow-
ing provisions: .. .all laws which require or regulate planning or
zoning. '6 7 To uphold the ordinance, the court unnecessarily went
beyond the "mandatory provisions" section of the self-government
powers code. All that was necessary for deciding the case was, first,
a finding that state laws mandating all local governments to follow
certain planning and zoning policies and procedures did not ad-
dress the topic of the Madison County ordinance and, second, a
citation of the instruction to construe liberally self-government
powers.68 Madison County had not ignored an express state man-
date, that is, acted "other than as provided."69 It was free to act as
63. Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982); D. & F. Sani-
tation Serv. v. City of Billings, 219 Mont. 437, 713 P.2d 977 (1986); Montana Innkeepers
Assoc. v. City of Billings, 206 Mont. 425, 671 P.2d 21 (1983); Brueggeman v. City of Billings,
221 Mont. 375, 719 P.2d 768 (1986); Clopton v. Madison County, 216 Mont. 335, 701 P.2d
347 (1985); Diefenderfer v. City of Billings, 223 Mont. 487, 726 P.2d 1362 (1986); Harlem,
Thompson, & Parish v. City of Helena, 208 Mont. 45, 676 P.2d 191 (1984).
64. State ex rel. Swart v. Molitor, 190 Mont. 515, 621 P.2d 1100 (1981); Billings
Firefighters Local 521 v. City of Billings, 214 Mont. 481, 694 P.2d 1335 (1985).
65. 190 Mont. 515, 621 P.2d 1100 (1981).
66. Id. at 520-21, 621 P.2d at 1103-04.
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114 (1)(e) (1989).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-106 (1989).
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(2) (1989).
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it chose because the statute was silent.
To decide the Molitor case, the court resorted to statutory
language from a different category of prohibitions on self-govern-
ment units, "consistency with state regulation required. ' 70 The
court stated:
Madison County's ordinance does not prescribe a lower standard
than required by the state statute, nor is it less stringent. There-
fore, under the statutory definition of inconsistency found in sec-
tion 7-1-113(2), MCA, Madison County's ordinance is not the ex-
ercise of a power inconsistent with state law.
7'
The legislature had provided that this category of state prohibi-
tions would be applicable only "if a state agency or officer is di-
rected to establish administrative rules governing the matter or if
enforcement of standards or requirements established by statute is
vested in a state officer or agency. ' 72 The court in Molitor made no
such critical finding.
The Molitor court further confused Montana's statutory law
concerning self-government powers when it used Montana Code
Annotated Section 7-1-103 to qualify Montana Code Annotated
Section 7-1-114(1)(f). The former section states that only statutory
limitations that are "specifically applicable to self-government
units" can restrict a self-government unit "which elects to provide
a service or perform a function that may also be provided or per-
formed by a general power government unit. ' 7 The latter section
states that self-government units are subject to "[a]ny law di-
recting or requiring a local government or any officer or employee
of a local government to carry out any function or provide any ser-
vice."7 The language of the two sections clearly addresses two dif-
ferent situations-one optional and the other mandatory-and the
court was wrong to confuse the law by juxtaposing the sections.
The other case in which the Montana Supreme Court wrongly
interpreted the state's self-government code was Billings Firefight-
ers Local 521 v. City of Billings.7" Billings, pursuant to its self-
government charter, adopted an ordinance "to create a fire service
that is exempt from all but two provisions of state law regarding
municipal fire departments. 7' The question the court considered
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-113 (1989).
71. Molitor, 190 Mont. at 521, 621 P.2d at 1104.
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-113(3) (1989).
73. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (1989).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(1)(f) (1989) (emphasis provided).
75. 214 Mont. 481, 694 P.2d 1335 (1985).
76. Id. at 483, 694 P.2d at 1336.
1990] 479
31
Cross: The Battle for the Environmental Provisions in Montana's 1972 Constitution
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
was similar to the Molitor situation: whether a self-government
unit can exempt itself from statutory provisions mandating "fire
departments in every city or town organized under whatever form
of municipal government."' " Conflicts between the self-government
ordinance and state law existed with respect to "qualifications for
firefighters, physical examination of applicants for the position of
firefighter, and funding of group insurance for firefighters. 7 8
As in the Molitor case, the court should have proceeded by
applying Montana Code Annotated Section 7-1-114(1)(f). The leg-
islature in Montana Code Annotated part 41 of title 7, chapter 33
had directed all local governments to have a fire department. The
pertinent question, then, was whether Billings was "acting other
than as provided," ' that is, did the mandatory fire service statute
specifically cover the subject matter of the self-government ordi-
nance. Instead, the court chose to use extraneous constitutional
and statutory provisions to decide the case.
First the court cited the "consistency with state regulation re-
quired" section of the self-government code80 and then argued:
Because the state statutes regarding the qualifications of physical
examination of and group insurance for firefighters define mini-
mum state standards and the Billings Ordinance sets forth no
standards governing these areas of legislative concern, the local
provisions are "lower or less stringent than those imposed by
state law."I"
The legislature, however, intended Montana Code Annotated Sec-
tion 7-1-113 to apply to the situation of state-local concurrent
powers.82 Its application requires a finding that the legislature has
vested a state agency with administrative responsibility parallel to
the identical subject area within the local government's jurisdic-
tion. In the Billings Firefighters case, however, the court made no
such finding and appeared to confuse legislating a regulatory stat-
ute with direct state administrative involvement.
The court also misused the Montana Constitution in its opin-
ion voiding the Billings ordinance. Section 5(3) of article XI reads:
"Charter provisions establishing executive, legislative, and admin-
istrative structure and organization are superior to statutory provi-
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-33-4102(1) (1989).
78. Billings Firefighters, 214 Mont. at 487, 694 P.2d at 1338.
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(2) (1989).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-113 (1989).
81. Billings Firefighters, 214 Mont. at 488, 694 P.2d at 1338.
82. See, State Commission on Local Government, Voter Review Laws, Comments, and
Summary, 2 LOCAL GOV'T REV. BULL. 113 (June 2, 1975).
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sions." This statement has no pertinence to an ordinance passed
by a municipality or county with a self-government charter. The
court, however, concludes "that the three statutory provisions
cited above are not executive, legislative or administrative in na-
ture."8 3 The court's point is that the constitutionally provided
charter's superiority does not come into play because the fire de-
partment statute deals with standards and not structure or organi-
zation. This argument misses the point. The issue is the legality of
a Billings ordinance, not of the charter provisions themselves.
In seven other self-government powers cases the Montana Su-
preme Court worked effectively with the several sections of the
self-government code, occasionally correcting implicitly the mis-
takes of the Molitor and Billings Firefighters cases.8" In Tipco
Corp. v. City of Billings,8" the court voided on equal protection
grounds an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation by some
merchants.86 In its dicta, however, the court significantly distin-
guished the state's Dillon's Rule tradition from the new era of lib-
eral construction of local government powers:
We expressly overrule statements in DeLong that a county, city
or town can only exercise powers expressly conferred on it by the
Constitution and statutes or arising by necessary implication and
that any reasonable doubt concerning such powers should be re-
solved against the municipality. This was the law under Mon-
tana's 1889 Constitution and cases decided thereunder. It is not
the law under Montana's 1972 Constitution and statutes enacted
thereunder. s7
Four years later, in D. & F. Sanitation Service v. City of Billings,
the court took similar action, here even more pointedly with re-
spect to self-government powers:
We expressly overrule statements in City of Billings v. Weather-
wax .. .that municipalities have only such power as is granted
83. Billings Firefighters, 214 Mont. at 487, 694 P.2d at 1338.
84. Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982); D. & F. Sani-
tation Serv. v. City of Billings, 219 Mont. 437, 713 P.2d 977 (1986); Montana Innkeepers
Assoc. v. City of Billings, 206 Mont. 425, 671 P.2d 21 (1983); Brueggemann v. City of Bill-
ings, 221 Mont. 375, 719 P.2d 768 (1986); Clopton v. Madison County Comm'n, 216 Mont.
335, 701 P.2d 347 (1985); Diefenderfer v. City of Billings, 223 Mont. 487, 726 P.2d 1362
(1986); Harlem, Thompson, & Parish v. City of Helena, 208 Mont. 45, 676 P.2d 191 (1984).
85. 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074 (1982).
86. Id. at 345, 642 P.2d at 1078. The Montana Supreme Court used constitutional
grounds in another case to void a self-government ordinance. In Harlem, Thompson, & Par-
ish v. City of Helena, 208 Mont. 45, 51, 676 P.2d 191, 194 (1984), the court held a business
license tax on attorneys to be violative of MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2, ch. 3.
87. Id. at 344, 642 P.2d at 1077 (overruling statements in DeLong v. Downes, 175
Mont. 152, 573 P.2d 160 (1977)).
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them by the legislature. This was the law under the 1889 Consti-
tution. It is not the law under the 1972 Constitution. Under the
new Constitution, the City of Billings has all powers save those
expressly prohibited.8
More important than recognizing the theoretical underpin-
nings of self-government powers was the court's proper interpreta-
tion of the self-government code. In D. & F. Sanitation Service,
the court upheld the city's regulation of garbage service against a
charge that no statutory authority existed for the ordinance.8 9 Fo-
cusing on the "powers denied" section of the self-government
code,90 the court stated:
The only way the doctrine of preemption by the state can co-exist
with self-government powers of a municipality is if there is an
express prohibition by statute which forbids local governments
with self-government powers from acting in a certain area. The
doctrine of implied pre-emption, by definition, cannot apply to
local governments with self-government powers .... The powers
specifically denied to local governments are enumerated in section
7-1-111, M.C.A 1
Here the court declared that it would not treat ambiguous statu-
tory provisions as prohibitions on self-government units.
Two cases dealt with the "powers requiring delegation" sec-
tion of the self-government code.9 2 In Montana Innkeepers Associ-
ation v. City of Billings,93 the court ruled that a tax on renting a
room is a sales tax and therefore void: "The power to tax the sale
of goods or services has not been delegated to local govern-
ments." 9" Similarly straightforward was the decision in Brueg-
gemann v. City of Billings . 5 Here the court found a tax on the
revenues generated by attorneys to be a sales tax, prohibited by
Montana Code Annotated Section 7-1-112(1). 96 In both cases the
court worked with the applicable category of prohibitions on self-
government units, interpreted its language, and made its decision.
The remaining two cases demonstrate that the Montana Su-
preme Court has in fact given the troublesome sections of the self-
88. D. & F. Sanitation Serv. v. City of Billings, 219 Mont. 437, 445, 713 P.2d 977, 982
(1986) (Weatherwax, - Mont. -, 630 P.2d 1216 (1981)).
89. Id. at 443-44, 713 P.2d 980-81.
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-111 (1989).
91. D. & F. Sanitation Serv., 219 Mont. at 444-45, 713 P.2d at 982.
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-112 (1989).
93. 206 Mont. 425, 671 P.2d 21 (1983).
94. Id. at 429, 671 P.2d at 23.
95. 221 Mont. 375, 719 P.2d 768 (1986).
96. Id. at 377-78, 719 P.2d at 770.
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government code, Montana Code Annotated Section 7-1-113,
"Consistency with state regulation required" and Section 7-1-114,
"Mandatory provisions," a proper reading. In Clopton v. Madison
County Commission,97 the court decided "whether or not sections
7-13-201 through 7-13-243, MCA, are mandatory requirements for
a charter form of government establishing a refuse disposal dis-
trict."98 The decision of the court was that these provisions did not
limit self-government units because they did not implicate Mon-
tana Code Annotated Section 7-1-114(f):
Sections 7-13-201 through 7-13-243, MCA, do not direct or re-
quire a local government to provide a service within the meaning
of section 7-1-114(1)(f), MCA. Sections 7-13-201 through 7-13-
243, MCA, contain provisions that are not consistent with the di-
rectives or requirements anticipated by section 7-1-114(1)(f),
MCA. For example section 7-13-211, MCA, allows sufficient pub-
lic protest to bar action on a refuse disposal district.9
Here, again, the court focused carefully on the exact language of
the pertinent section. It ruled that the implication of Montana
Code Annotated Section 7-1-114(1)(f) depended on a finding of a
state mandate to all local governments. 100 Unlike its reasoning in
Molitor,"'0 the court did not borrow the language of Montana Code
Annotated Section 7-1-103, which governs elective provision of ser-
vices, to decide a case arising under Montana Code Annotated Sec-
tion 7-1-114(1)(f), which governs situations where the state man-
dates self-government units to provide a service.
In 1986 the court gave further consideration to Montana Code
Annotated Sections 7-1-113 and 7-1-114. A Billings ordinance re-
quired developers to pay a surcharge, calculated at five percent of
the total cost of improvements, prior to creation of a special im-
provement district.1 02 The plaintiff in Diefenderfer v. City of Bill-
ings'0 argued that statutory provisions'" were controlling because
they mandated a local government service, established affirmative
state control of the area, and established an exclusive funding ar-
rangement for special improvement district expenses. 0 5 The court
quickly turned aside the Montana Code Annotated Section 7-1-114
97. 216 Mont. 335, 701 P.2d 347 (1985).
98. Id. at 338, 701 P.2d at 349.
99. Id. at 339-40, 701 P.2d at 350.
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
102. See Diefenderfer v. City of Billings, 223 Mont. 487, 726 P.2d 1362 (1982).
103. Id.
104. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-12-4169 to -4122 (1989).
105. Diefenderfer, 223 Mont. at 488, 726 P.2d at 1362.
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"Mandatory provisions" argument and focused on the Montana
Code Annotated Section 7-1-113 "consistency with state regula-
tion" issue, giving the statutory provision a critical reading that
was absent in the Billings Firefighters case. 106 The conclusion of
the court was that the argument concerning concurrent jurisdiction
and inconsistent local regulation was inappropriate: "Nor do we
find the area to be affirmatively subjected to state control. There is
no state agency authorized to establish administrative rules or en-
force the standards prescribed by statute."1 °7
The Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitu-
tion and self-government code in these nine cases has been some-
times flawed but generally reflective of the convention's and legis-
lature's intent. In Diefenderfer, the most recent case, the court
honored the legislature's pointed instruction to the judiciary: "The
powers of local self-governing units are to be liberally construed
pursuant to section 7-1-100, MCA. Therefore, [the Billings ordi-
nance] was a valid exercise of its self-governing power."' 08 Even
though the spirit of the court in self-government powers cases has
been proper, its crafting has been occasionally clumsy. But a suffi-
cient number of times the justices have demonstrated attentive-
ness and proficiency in their work with respect to each of the key
provisions of the self-government code. The court's underlying dis-
position in the self-government powers cases should obviate any
move to correct its mistakes by constitutional reform.
Similarly, the constitution should not make revisions in the
legislature's implementation of self-government powers-except
concerning revenue matters, which will be discussed below. The
reason is that the essence of Montana's version of home rule is
legislative supremacy and local residual discretion. Ordinarily,
then, legislative judgment should prevail, and legislative error
should be corrected by the legislature. The discussion above of
nine self-government powers cases pointed out some statutory lan-
guage in need of legislative revision. The present language of Mon-
tana Code Annotated Section 7-1-114(1)(f) is, in its sweep, not suf-
ficiently in tune with the constitutional intent for self-government
powers. It sets out one of the mandatory provisions for self-govern-
ment units: "Any law directing or requiring a local government or
any officer or employee of a local government to carry out any
function or provide any service." The problem with the statute is
that it adopts by careless reference pre-home rule legislation as the
106. Diefenderfer, 223 Mont. at 489-90, 726 P.2d at 1363-64.
107. 223 Mont. at 490, 726 P.2d at 1363.
108. Id. at 490. 726 P.2d at 1364.
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state mandates to self-government units. The legislature should
amend the section to read: "Any law specifically directing or re-
quiring a local government with self-government powers to carry
out any function or provide any service."
The constitutional convention meant to enhance the routine
governing discretion of home rule communities. Legislation en-
acted prior to the availability of self-government powers should
not be applied as limitations on self-government units unless legis-
lators so decide explicitly. For example, self-government powers
are a "misnomer" if a home rule city is restricted in the manage-
ment of its fire department by statutes pre-dating the 1972 Consti-
tution.10 9 The legislature should eliminate this travesty by at least
assuming the responsibility of approving specifically each state
mandate placed on self-government units.
V. LOCAL OPTION TAXES
The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention was broadly re-
form-minded concerning local government. The delegates' primary
goal was to make local government stronger and more responsible
to its citizenry. About its proposal, the local government commit-
tee wrote: "'Flexibility' and 'accountability' perhaps are over-used
at this Constitutional Convention, but no terms better describe the
goals embodied in the majority proposal of the Local Government
Committee." 110 The reform goals of the delegates were impeded,
however, by both self-imposed restrictions and unforeseen develop-
ments. Continuing legislative supremacy meant, in the delegates'
own assessment, that enhanced empowerment of local governments
would not extend to taxation. Delegate Thomas Ask, a leader on
the local government committee, said on the convention floor:
Under a charter, all the Legislature is going to do is set the limits
.... [aind I assume one of the limits will be taxation .... [t]hey
can operate within that and they don't have to follow any of the
other statutes, except for taxation or wherever they're limited.'
Another delegate further spelled out the convention's fears about
overly broad local discretion: "We won't have a situation of little
city-states under the proposal that we have here.""' 2 Subsequently
the Montana Legislature took actions that probably circumscribed
109. Interview with Robert Stockwell, Great Falls City Manager (Sept. 22, 1989)
[hereinafter Stockwell].
110. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 3, at 785 (Local Gov't Committee Comments).
111. VII TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 3, at 2527-28.
112. Id. at 2531 (Delegate Arness speaking).
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local governments even more than the convention delegates had
contemplated. The legislature denied to self-government units the
authority to use local income and sales taxes, as convention dele-
gates had predicted. But the legislature went even further with its
restrictions, repeatedly adding to the responsibilities and expenses
of local governments and reducing the efficacy of the property tax,
the local governments' only significant source of revenue. Because
the state constitution contains the judgment of Montanans about
what governmental principles are fundamental, a legitimate in-
quiry is whether the principles of "flexibility" and "accountability"
concerning local revenue discretion need further attention, espe-
cially given the local revenue predicament that Montanans face
today.
Contemporary local revenue problems are more of an urban
than a rural phenomenon. For years cities and urban counties have
felt that their revenue needs were not adequately addressed by
their lobbying associations, the Montana League of Cities and
Towns and the Montana Association of Counties. In 1981 six cities
and six counties formed a new association because of their poor
financial condition. The members were Butte-Silver Bow, Billings,
Great Falls, Missoula, Helena, Bozeman, and the counties of Yel-
lowstone, Cascade, Missoula, Lewis and Clark, and Gallatin. The
Urban Coalition is no longer functioning, but there is still a feeling
among its former members that the revenue situation of larger lo-
cal governments deserves special attention. Recently Great Falls
withdrew from the Montana League of Cities and Towns because
the League's too frequent position was, "we have to watch out for
small cities.""' The judgment of the Great Falls city manager is
that "the Montana League of Cities and Towns and the Montana
Association of Counties really represent small towns and rural
counties, and those governments don't want local option taxes."""
Much of the effort of the Urban Coalition went into docu-
menting its members' poor financial condition. For example, the
Urban Coalition's June, 1982, position paper pointed out that the
state's seven most populous counties pay seventy-five percent of
the state's general assistance welfare costs while having fifty-six
percent of the state's population and pay $7 million in district
court costs each year, compared to the state's $375,000. The paper
also said that the taxable valuation (adjusted for inflation) of the
coalition's members declined twelve percent between 1979 and




Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/13
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
1982 and property taxes increased by twenty-two percent during
the same period. There are indications that the situation has
grown worse in recent years. In 1978 a mill would raise $92,000 in
property tax revenue in Cascade County. In 1989 the figure was
$85,000. If the Montana Legislature had not exempted certain
properties from the local property tax, a Cascade County all-pur-
pose mill would have raised $168,000 in 1989.115 The annual deficit
for operating the district court in Cascade County runs between
$650,000 and $700,000, and the county has regularly negotiated
loans from the state Board of Investments.'
Any number of state governmental actions have weakened the
revenue situation of local governments. In the 1983 Legislature
alone, 550 bills were introduced that could have affected the level
of local property taxes.117 The decisions most frequently mentioned
by local government officials are removing business inventories and
farm machinery from property tax rolls, reducing the assessment
on Burlington Northern's Montana property, aligning the tax rate
on commercial properties with other properties, and reducing mo-
tor vehicle license fees. At the same time the legislature has regu-
larly added to the cost of running a local government, for example,
by doubling the fee for jurors. Some legislators recognized the tight
situation in which they had placed local governments and their
residents. Representative Verner Bertelsen observed in 1983:
"'We've got to figure out some way to put back into local govern-
ment funding not only the loss they've suffered because of our ac-
tions, but also to give them the control of where it comes from and
how it's used.' "118 Lacking amelioration by the legislature, local of-
ficials warned that there soon would be a property tax revolt.
The predicted citizen resistance came to fruition in 1986 with
voter adoption of Initiative 105. That measure froze property taxes
at their 1986 levels and invited the legislature to supersede the
freeze by acting prior to July 1, 1987, to reduce property taxes and
establish other revenue sources. The intensity of the electorate's
dissatisfaction becomes obvious when the fate of Constitutional In-
itiative 27 is considered. On the same November 1986, election
day, voters rejected an attempt to abolish all property taxes, but
only by the margin of 140,168 to 176,437. Arguments from the
"1986 Voter Information Pamphlet" give some explanation of what
115. Interview with Jack Whitaker, Chairman, Cascade County Commission (Sept. 22,
1989).
116. Interview with Patrick Paul, Cascade County Attorney (Sept. 22, 1989).
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was behind the voters' mood. Between 1980 and 1986 property
taxes in Montana had risen more than fifty percent, placing the
state second in the nation in terms of property taxes paid as a per-
centage of income. Property taxes had come to represent the prin-
cipal source of local governmental revenue: sixty percent of all
school funds, nearly fifty percent of all county funds, and fifty per-
cent of all city funds.
The Montana Legislature failed to accept the challenge of Ini-
tiative 105 and reform the state's tax system. Hostility and inactiv-
ity with respect to local government tax reform have been the typi-
cal legislative responses since 1977 when the proposed
recodification of local government law was rejected. The legislature
again rejected the proposed code's local option taxes in 1979. In
1985, the House of Representatives voted down on third reading
House Bill 804, which would have allowed local governments to im-
pose an income or sales tax after the approval of the local electo-
rate. A similar measure met the same fate in 1987. That session's
local option tax bill would have authorized a county or municipal-
ity to impose any type of tax not prohibited by law, subject to the
voters' approval. Included in the authorization would have been a
local sales tax and a local income tax.119
The Montana Legislature has repeatedly refused to surrender
to local governments its power over local fiscal affairs. Legislators
have not accepted the central argument of local government offi-
cials that taxing authority should be linked with responsibility for
providing services. Instead, legislators have continued to mandate
duties and withhold taxing discretion. The apparent openness of
the Montana public to local option taxes has not been persuasive
with legislators. A 1986 poll asked Montana voters their opinions
about various methods of increasing public revenues.120 The follow-
ing figures represent the aggregate percentage of respondents who
favored "strongly" and "somewhat" the different options: state
sales tax-fifty-two percent; state-wide hotel and motel room
tax-sixty-eight percent; state-run lottery-seventy-five percent;
eliminating some existing personal income tax and business tax de-
ductions-forty-two percent; and local option taxes-seventy-two
percent. Included in the definition of local option tax was voter
approval before implementation. The pertinent conclusion from
this data is that the large majority of Montanans who favor local
option taxes do not think that the legislature is a necessary check
119. MONT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FUNDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE: A
REPORT TO THE 50TH MONTANA LEGISLATURE, 72 (Dec. 1986).
120. Flemming & Lenihan, The Montana Poll, 24 MONT. BUS. Q., 18 (Summer 1986).
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on local tax policy. Local residents favor local governments having
enhanced revenue-raising discretion as long as they, the voters, can
have final say on adoption.
The legislature's stubborn refusal to breathe new life into the
constitutional principles of local government flexibility and ac-
countability will probably be overcome only by one of two meth-
ods: local government fiscal crisis or constitutional revision. The
legislature's characteristic mode of activity-distracted, frag-
mented, and pluralistically provincial treatment of too many top-
ics-would be set aside in the instance of local option taxes if all
concerned parties were crying doom. Waiting for such a day, how-
ever, is irresponsible and unnecessary. The people of Montana can
be both consistent with their immediate constitutional past and re-
sponsible sovereigns in amending their constitution to bring about
a measure of local fiscal autonomy.
Despite the long-time failure of the legislature, the needed
constitutional revision should be cautious, respectful of not only
the plight of local governments but also existing constitutional
themes and statewide political realities. The constitutional locus of
the reform should be article XI, section 6, "Self-government pow-
ers." An amendment should add a final sentence, to read: Legisla-
tive prohibitions shall not include a voter-approved income tax.
The conservative nature of this reform stems from its being limited
to self-government units, tied to the existing state income tax, and
conditioned upon a referendum.
Article XI, as it exists, contains an excellent legal framework
that should continue to guide the practices of Montana local gov-
ernment. One of its central principles is that self-government units
have more discretion than local governments with general powers.
A justification for the special status of self-government units is
voter approval. Enhanced local government power, therefore, is re-
served for communities that have gone through the process of pop-
ular reflection and judgment. The constitutional amendment to
make available a local option income tax should honor this funda-
mental dichotomy among local governments. Only self-government
units should enjoy the option of a local income tax.
The constitutional amendment concerning local taxing power
should be limited to the income tax. The income tax is an estab-
lished part of the state's system of raising revenue. It does not
share in the controversy that surrounds the sales tax. A bureau-
cracy of experienced employees and settled procedures oversees its
administration. Using the state income tax as the vehicle for ad-
ministering a local income tax would create a minimum of confu-
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sion and adjustment.
Local politics would be a sufficient check on the wisdom of
providing and retaining a local income tax. Local residents, far
more capably than a distant legislature, could assess the arguments
of local officials concerning such issues as the need for the tax, its
use, and its impact on the local property tax. Local officials would
be the best discussants of the measure's benefits and disadvan-
tages, knowing more than anyone the intricacies of local needs, fi-
nances, and politics. Some self-government communities would
adopt a local income tax, and others would undoubtedly resolve
the tangle of issues the other way. In either instance, the constitu-
tion would have made true flexibility and accountability the fac-
tors of local fiscal politics, replacing the baneful paradox of legisla-
tive arrogance and timidity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Article XI is one of the most solid parts of the Montana Con-
stitution. The constitution's reputation as a thoughtful, progres-
sive, and highly functional document is due in no small part to
article XI. It incorporated the best thinking and practices nation-
ally concerning local government. It continues to provide a legal
framework for effective local government in the state. There is
nothing wrong with article XI. Any revisions of article XI that
were advocated in this essay are to correct legislative failings.
This essay discussed four problems related to local govern-
ment and asked in each case whether the best solution was consti-
tutional revision. These problems suggested themselves because of
the principal concerns of the constitutional convention delegates in
1972 and of the local government officials who have worked under
the new state constitution since that time. The problems discussed
were insufficient structural flexibility, inadequate county powers,
overly restrictive limitations on self-government powers, and too
limited revenue-raising discretion. The conclusions with respect to
recommended solutions were: (1) local governments presently have
sufficient structural flexibility and have used such opportunities
well; (2) the addition of a facilitative annexation provision in the
constitution would keep counties in the desirable mode of rural
governments functioning as administrative adjuncts of the state;
(3) judges should be more respectful of the discrete nature of the
legislative limitations on self-government powers, and the legisla-
ture should take steps so that pre-1972 grants of general powers
could not be applied unwittingly to self-government units; and, (4)
the constitution should guarantee the availability of a local option
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income tax to self-government units.
The further conclusion of this essay is that, from the perspec-
tive of local government law and practice, the people of Montana
should not call a constitutional convention to consider reforms.
Today it is crucial that the state constitution enhance the ability
of municipalities to be the principal government in urban areas
and of self-government units to tax incomes. These reforms, how-
ever, can be achieved by amendment. A convention should be re-
sorted to only when the solution to a critical governmental prob-
lem turns upon the application of up-to-then unarticulated basic
principles, is too complex for the amendment process, or requires
full discussion and has been repeatedly ignored by the legislature.
The ideas for local government reform presented here do not re-
quire opening up the Montana Constitution and jeopardizing all
that is good within it.
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